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Presumed Fair?
Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of our Criminal Justice
System
Vida B. Johnson*
ABSTRACT
The American criminal justice system is built on three bedrock principles:
the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. These ideals, however, are frequently ignored by
jurors. Social science research has shown that jurors routinely believe that a
defendant must prove his innocence, and that the mere fact that the defendant
is standing trial is proof of guilt. Jurors persist in these beliefs despite proper
instructions on the law.
Despite the acknowledged centrality of these legal ideals, trial courts in
many jurisdictions, routinely prevent defense attorneys from questioning
prospective jurors on these fundamental legal issues based on a mistaken view
that jurors will follow the given instructions. Unlike instructions, voir dire
regarding prospective jurors’ ability or willingness to apply the presumption of
innocence and hold the government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not granted uniformly across jurisdictions. While the Supreme Court
has sanctioned voir dire in capital cases on whether jurors can impose the death
penalty, it has thus far remained silent on whether there is a right under the Due
Process Clause to question prospective jurors on the presumption of innocence
and the government’s burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. The states
and federal circuits are split on the question.
This Article explores whether, in order to ensure fundamental principles of
fairness, voir dire questions about the presumption of innocence and the burden
of proof should be required in all criminal jury trials.
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INTRODUCTION: THE RIGHT TO VOIR DIRE REGARDING THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT
Three related legal principles are indispensable to a fair criminal
trial: the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Over a century ago the
United States Supreme Court declared “the principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”1 The burden of
the government to produce proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
1

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
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“dates at least from our early years as a Nation,” and the Supreme
Court has concluded it is “basic in our law” and a constitutional
requirement under the Due Process Clause.2
These core principles are, unfortunately, too frequently ignored
by jurors. Legal instructions given by trial judges on the presumption
of innocence and the burden of proof, while virtually universally given,
are insufficient. A mounting body of social science has shown that
jurors routinely believe that a defendant must prove his innocence,
and that the mere fact that the defendant is standing trial—following
arrest and indictment—is proof of guilt. Jurors persist in these beliefs
despite proper instructions on these central legal principles.
Jurors who refuse to apply these vital principles in criminal cases
erode the very foundation of a fair trial. Enforcement of these crucial
doctrines in criminal jury trials requires a jury selection process that
ferrets out the potential jurors who are unable to understand or
unwilling to apply the presumption of innocence and the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Despite the acknowledged centrality of these legal ideals, trial
courts in many jurisdictions routinely prevent defense attorneys from
questioning prospective jurors on these fundamental legal issues based
on a mistaken view that jurors will follow the given instructions. So,
while the parties usually know a prospective juror’s age, field of
employment, and neighborhood, arguably the most important
information one needs to know about a juror sitting on any criminal
case is missing—can the juror be fair?
Unlike instructions, voir dire regarding prospective jurors’ ability
or willingness to apply the presumption of innocence and hold the
government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not
granted uniformly across jurisdictions. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has thus far remained silent on whether there is a right under the Due
Process Clause to such an inquiry, and the states and federal circuits
are split on the question.3
2

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970) (quotations omitted).
United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 519 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that where
there are sufficient instructions, voir dire on the presumption of innocence is not
required); United States v. Miller, 758 F.2d 570, 572 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding no abuse
of discretion for trial court not to question venire on presumption of innocence and
reasonable doubt); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding
that failure to allow voir dire on presumption of innocence upon request is error);
State v. Dahlgreen, 512 A.2d 906, 910 (Conn. 1986) (finding that the trial court
properly precluded voir dire on presumption of innocence); Baker v. State, 853 A.2d
796, 805–06 (Md. 2002) (finding that voir dire on presumption of innocence not
required); People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Ill. 1984) (holding that a trial
court’s refusal to ask question about presumption of innocence warranted reversal of
3
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There is, however, Supreme Court precedent regarding “death
qualified” juries in capital cases that supports the argument for voir
dire on the application of the presumption of innocence and the goal
of “presumption of innocence qualified” juries. In capital cases more
expansive voir dire of the venire is allowed than is typical in most
criminal trials. Prosecutors routinely request that prospective jurors
be “death qualified.”4 Specifically, prospective jurors are asked
whether they would be able to return a death sentence in the event of
a conviction. Jurors who answer that they would be unable to return a
death sentence in the event of conviction are struck from the jury
panel “for cause.” The resulting jury is referred to as “death-qualified.”
After the Supreme Court held that the government was entitled to voir
dire in order to ensure that jurors in capital cases would be willing to
sentence a guilty defendant to death5, it ruled that capital defendants
had a corollary right: the right to inquire if prospective jurors would
automatically impose the death penalty upon a verdict of guilt and
strike such jurors for cause.6 Thus, the Supreme Court has found both
a government’s entitlement to voir dire concerning the prospective
jurors’ willingness to apply the death penalty and a defendant’s right
to voir dire regarding the prospective jurors’ willingness to not apply
the death penalty where jury instructions that clearly require jurors to
fairly consider both potential outcomes exists.
Just as defendants in capital cases are entitled to voir dire in order
to exclude jurors who, despite instructions to the contrary, would
impose the death penalty in all cases following a finding of guilt,
defendants in all criminal jury trials should be entitled to voir dire to
exclude jurors who would disregard the presumption of innocence,
and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the
very purpose of voir dire and the jury selection process is to eliminate
jurors who cannot be fair, and because the presumption of innocence,
conviction); State v. Cere, 125 N.H. 421, 424–25 (N.H. 1984) (finding that judges were
required to ask whether juries believed that the defendant bears the burden of proving
his innocence in a criminal case); Jones v. United States, 378 So.2d 797, 798 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (stating that defense attorney should be allowed to inquire of
prospective jurors about the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof);
Harper v. State, 474 S.E. 2d 288, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that questions of
legal nature, like whether juror can follow instructions on the presumption of
innocence, are “not within the purview of voir dire”); New Jersey v. Lumumba, 601
A.2d 1178, 1189 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“[T]he jury must be asked whether
they understand the basic principles of presumption of innocence . . . .”).
4
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986) (finding that “deathqualification” does not violate right to impartial jury).
5
Whitherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
6
See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 170 n.7; Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
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and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are foundational
legal principles without which there cannot be a fair criminal trial, an
opportunity to conduct voir dire regarding the potential jurors’
willingness to apply these principles should be a requirement for every
criminal jury trial.
This Article explores whether voir dire questions about the
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof should be
required in all criminal jury trials. To that end, the centrality of the
presumption of innocence and standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to a fair trial is briefly reviewed, the basic procedure and
jurisprudence of voir dire, jury selection, and jury instructions will be
explained, precedent for instructions regarding the three core
principles is considered, along with the social science demonstrating
the inadequacy of such instructions, precedent for voir dire regarding
the three principles is reviewed, the entitlement to death-qualification
voir dire is examined, the relationship between death-qualification voir
dire and presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and standard of
proof voir dire is explored. Suggestions to defense attorneys concludes
the Article.
I. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF, AND
THE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT: PRINCIPLES
ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR TRIAL
Our criminal justice system is premised on the lofty ideal of
fairness7 and, according to the Supreme Court, “no right ranks higher
than the right of the accused to a fair trial.”8 The presumption of
innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are
the legal principles comprising the foundation of any just criminal trial
in the United States.
The Supreme Court has observed that the presumption of
innocence is “a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice,”9 and the history of the presumption of innocence has
been “traced [ . . . ] from Deuteronomy through Roman law, English
common law, and the common law of the United States.”10 The
presumption of innocence is related to “the prosecution’s duty both to
produce evidence of guilt and to convince the jury beyond a
7

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[O]ur system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”).
8
Press-Enter. v. Super. Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
9
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478, 479 (1978).
10
Taylor, 436 U.S. at 483.
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reasonable doubt” before a criminal conviction may be obtained.11
The Court has also noted that the presumption of innocence “cautions
the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from
the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their
conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced.”12
The presumption of innocence is first and foremost a trial right.13
Because of the importance of this right, a number of safeguards have
already been put in place to enforce it. Jurors do not hear about an
accused person’s prior conviction because of the presumption of
innocence.14 The right of detained defendants not to be handcuffed
or shackled before a jury15 or to wear civilian clothes in front of a jury16
are just some examples of additional efforts to safeguard the rights of
the criminally accused. The Supreme Court has made it clear that trial
courts have an obligation to take steps to ensure that criminal
defendants receive the benefit of the presumption of innocence and
that the government is held to its burden.17
The presumption of innocence and the burden of proof in a
criminal trial are related. The standard of proof of beyond a
reasonable doubt “provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence” and has a “vital role in our criminal procedure,” which is
“indispensable” and it is the “prime instrument for reducing the risk
of convictions resting on factual error.”18 And “[t]he requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal cases is bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”19 The
Supreme Court has “explicitly [held] that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.”20

11

Id. at n.14.
Taylor, 436 U.S. at 485 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940)).
13
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1979).
14
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967) (Stuart, J., concurring) (“Evidence
of prior convictions has been forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of
innocence of the crime currently charged.”).
15
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626–627 (2005) (reasoning that it was an error
to shackle and handcuff defendant for the penalty phase of his capital trial).
16
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).
17
Deck, 544 U.S, at 626–27; Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512.
18
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
19
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
12
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In addition to concluding that these principles are fundamental
to a fair trial, the Supreme Court has also stated that “[i]t is selfevident . . . that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury
verdict are interrelated.”21 As this Article will discuss, however, the
mechanisms required by the Supreme Court for ensuring verdicts
based on these fundamental principles fall short, rendering these
important principles and their underlying goal—a fair trial—in some
instances an ideal rather than a reality.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE THREE PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
INEFFICACY
Ensuring that verdicts in criminal cases are based on an
application of the fundamental principles of the presumption of
innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
requires at least two components: 1) legal instructions that accurately
communicate the principles to the jury, and 2) jurors who are willing
and able to follow those instructions. Unfortunately, significant
problems exist with both components. The Supreme Court’s
precedent thus far has focused on the first: jury instructions.
A. Basics of Jury Instructions
In every jury trial, the jury’s role is to consider the evidence and
reach a verdict based on its view of the evidence within the legal
framework provided by the judge. Jury instructions are the law distilled
for the jury, with the goal of accurately stating the law in terms that
jurors can understand and apply. Jury instructions in criminal cases
generally include explanations of the presumption of innocence22 and
the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.23
Jurors are also instructed on the elements of the charged crime,
any affirmative defenses, and rules regarding the consideration of
certain types of evidence, e.g., “other crimes” evidence, impeachment
evidence, evaluation of certain types of witnesses, and other casespecific instructions. Each individual instruction may not be long—
the model federal jury instruction about the presumption of
innocence is just four sentences long—though when taken together
the instructions can be very lengthy.24
21
22
23
24

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993).
1-4 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL P 4.01, INSTRUCTION 4–1.
1-4 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL P 4.01, INSTRUCTION 4–2.
1-4 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL P 4.01, INSTRUCTION 4–1 reads:
The defendant has pleaded not guilty to the charge in the indictment.
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Jury instructions are stated orally by the judge, and in some
courtrooms the judge will provide a written copy of the instructions
either simultaneously with or subsequent to providing the instructions
orally. Most instructions are provided after the close of evidence and
are frequently provided even after the closing arguments of counsel.25
Legal instructions are rarely provided prior to the evidentiary portion
of trial.26 And although pre-instruction has gained in popularity and
proved effective, the practice continues to be relatively uncommon in
trial courtrooms.27
Jury instructions are often complicated and quite lengthy.28 While
written instructions have proved to be a helpful aide to jurors’
comprehension of often complex and lengthy legal instructions, fewer
than half of trial judges follow the practice of providing written
instructions to jurors.29 When written instructions are provided, they
are usually provided after the close of all evidence and trial judges do
not always provide sufficient copies of the instructions for each juror
to have her own copy.30 As will be discussed, legal instructions and the
manner in which they are provided do not sufficiently educate jurors.

To convict the defendant, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the
defendant’s guilt of each element of the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant, for the simple reason
that the law presumes a defendant to be innocent and never imposes
upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any
witness or producing any evidence. In other words, each defendant
starts with a clean slate and is presumed innocent of each charge until
such time, if ever, that you as a jury are satisfied that the Government
has proved a given defendant is guilty of a given charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.
25
How Courts Work, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_edu
cation_network/how_courts_work/juryinstruct.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
26
See Gregory E. Mize, Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L.Waters, The States-of-theStates Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report 36 (2007), available at
http://www.ncscjurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx.
27
G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR & G. MARC WHITEHEAD,
JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 132–2 (2006).
28
Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 449, 451–52 (2006).
29
Mize et al., supra note 26, at 37.
30
Id. Of the judges that do provide written instructions to the jurors, only onethird provide them to all of the sitting jurors. Id.
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B. Instructions on the Presumption of Innocence and the Standard of
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Because the legal principles concerning the presumption of
innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt have
been recognized as being fundamental to a fair criminal trial, jury
instructions communicating those principles are required in jury trials.
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, a capital murder case, the Supreme Court held
that because the Due Process Clause requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury trial
are interrelated, a guilty verdict in a criminal jury trial must be based
on a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.31 In other words,
the jury must be properly instructed on the government’s burden to
present evidence of guilt, and that the evidence of guilt must rise to
the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may
return a guilty verdict.32 The Supreme Court has further held that
where the jury instructions fail to accurately communicate the burden
of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, structural error has occurred:
harmless-error analysis does not apply and automatic reversal is
required.33
Where the jury has been properly instructed on the government’s
burden and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, separate
instruction on the presumption of innocence is still a virtual
requirement, although the Supreme Court has stopped short of
holding it to be structural error or even necessarily constitutional error
requiring reversal unless the error can be deemed harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. In Taylor v. Kentucky,34 a robbery case, the jury was
properly instructed with respect to the government’s burden of proof
of beyond a reasonable doubt, but the trial court denied the defense
attorney’s request for separate jury instructions explaining the
presumption of innocence and the related legal principle that
indictment has no evidentiary weight.35 The Supreme Court reversed
Taylor’s conviction.36 In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed
that the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof of beyond
a reasonable doubt are “equally fundamental” and logically related

31

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993).
Id.
33
Id. at 280–82.
34
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
35
After the presentation of evidence, the attorney’s second request for the
instructions was again refused. Id. at 481.
36
Id. at 490.
32
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principles.37 Although the principles are related, the Court noted that
“scholars advise against abandoning the instruction on the
presumption of innocence, even when a complete explanation of the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is provided.”38 The Court
favorably quoted language from Wigmore that an instruction
specifically on the presumption of innocence “‘cautions the jury to put
away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the
indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely
from the legal evidence adduced.’”39 The Court concluded that an
instruction on the presumption of innocence has a “purging effect”
that is a “means of protecting the accused’s constitutional right to be
judged solely on the basis of proof adduced at trial.”40
The Court in Taylor held that an instruction on the presumption
of innocence was required and reached this conclusion despite the fact
that defense counsel had discussed the presumption of innocence in
both his opening statement and closing argument because “arguments
of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court.”41 The Court
was also not swayed by the fact that defense counsel had, during an
attorney-conducted voir dire, asked potential jurors about their
understanding of the presumption of innocence.42 The Court,
however, did not explicitly hold that a separate instruction on the
presumption of innocence is required in every trial, instead holding
that on the “facts of this case”—where the instructions on the
government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt were
“spartan” and the prosecutor made arguments about the standard in
closing—an instruction on the presumption of innocence was
required.43
Justice Brennan joined the Court’s opinion in Taylor, but wrote a
separate concurrence simply to note that “as is clear from the Court’s
opinion . . . trial judges should instruct the jury on a criminal
defendant’s entitlement to a presumption of innocence in all cases
where such an instruction is requested.”44 The following year, however,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kentucky v. Whorton, to
37

Id. at 483 n.12.
Id. at 484 (quoting J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 551–76
(1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 805–06
(2d ed. 1972).
39
Id. at 485 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940)).
40
Taylor, 436 U.S at 486 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
41
Id. at 488–89 (citations omitted).
42
Id. at 479–80.
43
Id. at 486–87, 490.
44
Id. at 490–91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38
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determine whether the Kentucky Supreme Court had correctly
interpreted the Court’s holding in Taylor as requiring a presumption
of innocence instruction in all criminal trials.45 The Court held that it
had not created such a requirement, and that a failure to provide a
requested instruction on the presumption of innocence may violate
the Due Process Clause when considered “in light of the totality of the
circumstances,” including the other jury instructions.46 Heeding
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Taylor, and avoiding an unnecessary
risk of constitutional error, most—if not all—jurisdictions have
implemented standard jury instructions on the presumption of
innocence.47
C. Inadequacy of Presumption of Innocence Jury Instructions &
Instructions in General
While the Court has recognized the importance of these legal
principles, regrettably many jurors do not recognize their significance.
The required instructions on the government’s burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and the instructions on the presumption
of innocence, which are now provided in virtually every criminal jury
trial, do not ensure that the principles are enforced in every criminal
jury trial.48 Instructions vary from one jurisdiction to another. Many,
45

Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 787 (1979).
Id. at 790.
47
Mize et al., supra note 26, at 36.
48
While apparently every jurisdiction has standardized instructions on the
principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the language within the instructions varies between
jurisdictions. Compare 1-1 MD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY § 1.05,
INSTRUCTION 1.04 (1998), stating:
[A] reasonable doubt is a doubt founded upon reason. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt requires such proof as would convince you of the truth
of a fact to the extent that you would be willing to act upon such belief
without reservation in an important matter in your own business or
personal affairs.
with 1-II CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.108, stating:
[R]easonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable
person, after careful and thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the
graver or more important matters in life. It is not an imaginary doubt,
however, nor a doubt based on speculation or guesswork; it is a doubt
based on reason. The government is not required to prove guilt beyond
all doubt, or to a mathematical or scientific certainty. Its burden is to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
and MA SUP. CT. CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.1.2, explaining:
[W]hat is proof beyond a reasonable doubt? The term is often used and
probably pretty well understood, though it is not easily defined. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all
possible doubt, for everything in the lives of human beings is open to
46
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if not all, jurisdictions presume that jurors—who swear an oath to apply
the law as it is stated to them—follow the jury instructions.49
Not only are jurors presumed to understand the trial court’s
instruction, the Supreme Court has said that even jurors who have
expressed confusion on a legal issue, and are then pointed back to the
same instruction that was the source of the original confusion that
jurors are nevertheless, “presumed to understand a judge’s answer to
its question.”50 So even in the face of evidence of juror confusion,
courts insist that jurors understand and will follow instructions.
While the assumption that jurors can understand the instructions
given to them is common, it is an inaccurate one. Jurors, of course,
are lay people with varying levels of education and comprehension
who tend not to have legal training. Studies show that even wellmeaning jurors have a difficult time understanding the legal
instructions given to them. Studies consistently show since 1970 that
“jurors do not understand their instructions.”51 Despite forty years of
evidence, jury instructions and the manner in which they are delivered
have changed little.52 One researcher has written that “comprehension
by jurors of the instructions given them is dysfunctionally low.”53
Another has said that “lay persons are frequently bewildered by the
wording of jury instructions.”54 The process of instructing the jury can
take a significant amount of time especially in more complicated cases
that involve various theories of liability or multiple charges. Little is
done to ensure that jurors understand or even pay attention to the
instructions given by the trial judge. One observer has forecasted that
some possible or imaginary doubt. A charge is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt if, after you have compared and considered all of the
evidence, you have in your minds an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, that the charge is true.
49
See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (finding that death
sentence should be upheld despite questions by jury about legal instructions and
where judge responded to the questions using the same instruction); Harris v. United
States, 602 A.2d 154, 165 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (“The jury is presumed to have
followed these instructions . . . and this court will not upset a verdict by assuming the
jury declined to do so.” (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted)); Hall
v. United States, 171 F.2d 347, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (“[J]urors should be presumed
to have understood and followed the court’s instructions.”); Landay v. United States,
108 F.2d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 1939); Parmagini v. United States, 42 F.2d 721, 724 (9th
Cir. 1930).
50
Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234.
51
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67
N.C.L. REV. 77, 79 (1988).
52
Marder, supra note 28 at 452, 458–75.
53
Steele, supra note 51, at 92.
54
Bethany Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension
Issue, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 702 (2000).
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“adequate juror comprehension is unattainable.”55
The most likely reason for the juror comprehension problem is
that legal instructions are written above the ability level of most jurors.
The average legal instruction is written at or above a 12th grade level,56
while the typical adult American has an 8th grade reading
comprehension level.57 Some even believe this figure to be declining.58
And with most legal instructions delivered orally, the fact that listening
comprehension may be even lower than reading comprehension59
should be yet another cause for concern. One legal observer has said
that the jurors are like students studying for an exam when they are
given legal instructions because they are learning topics previously
foreign to them.60 However, unlike students, jurors are never tested on
their knowledge of any topic, are limited in their ability to ask
questions, and are asked to absorb a large amount of information in a
relatively compact period of time.
Jurors’ struggles with comprehending the law extend even to the
core legal principles necessary to a fair criminal trial: the presumption
of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
One study showed that 50 percent of prospective jurors believed that
it was the defendant who had to prove his innocence.61 That same study
showed that 49.9 percent of people who had previous jury experience
agreed that defendants had to prove their innocence.62 A Washington
Post poll showed that 31 percent of people believed that if a person
had been charged with a crime, he was probably guilty of at least some
crime.63 In another poll, about 30 percent of people eligible for jury
55

John P. Cronan, Is Any of this Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid
Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1187, 1189 (2002).
56
Rachel Small, Judith Platania and Brian Cutler, Assessing the Readability of Capital
Pattern Jury Instructions, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 31, 2013), available at http://
www.thejuryexpert.com/2013/01/assessing-the-readability-of-capital-pattern-juryinstructions/.
57
Id.
58
Hector Tobar, American Adults Have Low (and Declining) Reading Proficiency, LA
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-americanadults-have-low-and-declining-reading-proficiency-20131008-story.html.
59
Small et al., supra note 56 (“[It is] likely that jurors would experience greater
difficulty with listening comprehension compared to reading comprehension.”).
60
Dumas, supra note 54, at 714.
61
HEARST CORPORATION, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, THE MEDIA AND THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM: A NATIONAL SURVEY ON PUBLIC AWARENESS AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, tbl. 5D at
15 (1986).
62
Id.
63
NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, 1 JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2:7 (Nov. 2014)
(citing Turner, Tabulation of Attitude Data on Criminal Justice Issues from A National Survey
(Washington, D.C.: National Research Council- National Academy of Sciences)
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service in Miami and Atlanta thought that a person is probably guilty
if the person is charged by the government and brought to trial. Even
worse, more than 40 percent of people eligible for jury service in those
two cities expected a defendant to prove his innocence despite a judge’s
instructions on the matter.64
In addition to jurors who are unable to intellectually grasp the
legal instructions given by the judge, there are some jurors who are
simply unwilling to follow the law. These are jurors who have hostility
toward criminal defendants generally. There are members of the
public who for whatever reason—the media’s sensationalist focus on
crime,65 racial animus toward the race of the accused,66 or a simple
belief that because the defendant was arrested, that is sufficient to show
his guilt—do not believe in the presumption of innocence or believe
that the burden should be on the government to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jury instructions on the law will come too late for
these people if they are unwilling to follow the law, even if they can
understand it.
These people will not be identified if voir dire on the burden of
proof and the presumption of innocence is not allowed. Without
questioning during the voir dire practice, the possibility exists that
some people with general opposition to those accused of crime will sit
on juries either unfairly convicting defendants or causing a mistrial in
a case that would otherwise result in an acquittal.
The results of these studies likely reflect a combination of jurors
who are unable to understand the jury instructions, which can be
complicated and lengthy, and jurors who understand the principles
but are unwilling to apply them. Ultimately, the studies show that
instructions alone do not serve to enforce the principles that are the
(unpublished manuscript) (June 1979)).
64
NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, 1 JURYWORK SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2:7 (Nov. 2014)
(citing a National Jury Project poll from 2005).
65
For a discussion on the news media, the internet, and crime dramas creating a
“climate of fear” in the mainstream public, see Rachel Lyon, Media, Race and the Death
Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 743–52 (2009). She finds that people who watch
television news are the most likely to be fearful of crime. Id. at 746. The demographics
of viewers of these programs are the ones “most likely to be jury members.” Id. at 751.
She also shows that defense attorneys are portrayed negatively on most crime dramas
while police and prosecutors are portrayed generally as benevolent actors who rarely
make mistakes. Id. at 752. See also Perry Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and
Legal Decision Making, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 856–61 (2010).
66
Jonathan Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist
Assumptions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 999, 1015 (2013) (“[J]urors are more likely
to associate black defendants with guilt . . .”). See also Justin Levinson, Huajian Cai &
Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Bias: the Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010).
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foundation of a fair trial.67 Instead, the jury selection process, through
voir dire, must produce juries composed of individuals who are willing
and able to apply the presumption of innocence, the standard of
proof, and the burden of proof. Voir dire on the issues of burden of
proof and the presumption of innocence will allow trial courts to
dismiss for cause jurors who refuse or are unable to hold the
government to its burden, and allow defense attorneys to exercise
peremptory challenges for those the attorney suspects is unable to
follow the law. Voir dire also has the added benefit of exposing jurors
early on to the legal principles prior to their synthesizing evidence or
hearing arguments from either side.
III. VOIR DIRE REGARDING THE THREE PRINCIPLES IS A NECESSARY
MECHANISM TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL
Questioning during voir dire that will identify jurors who are
unable or unwilling to follow the law is a way to enforce the
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in jury trials. If trial courts allow a broader voir dire
and jury selection process, that may increase the likelihood that the
selected jurors will in fact apply the legal principles as they are stated
in the jury instructions. Ignoring the fact that a substantial number of
jurors do not follow the law guarantees trials that are unfair to criminal
defendants.
A.

Basics of Voir Dire and Jury Selection

The purpose of voir dire is to identify members of the venire who
are unfit to sit as jurors during the trial.68 During the voir dire process
the entire jury panel is placed under oath and asked a series of
questions. The answers to these questions inform the parties’ motions
67

Some of the jurisdictions polled, e.g. Florida, allow voir dire on the
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof. See FL
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.7. The study that polled Miami
residents covered potential jurors, not individuals who had been subject to the voir
dire process. NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, 1 JURYWORK SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2:7 (Nov.
2014). The voir dire process in Florida should serve to filter out most of the
problematic potential jurors. There is no reason to believe that Miami residents think
differently than potential jurors in other jurisdictions; in fact, the polls from other
jurisdictions show relative uniformity in that regard. Many other jurisdictions,
however, do not have voir dire processes like Florida’s to filter out the problematic
potential jurors.
68
Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but
Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60
UCLA L. REV. 262, 300 (2012). See also Ann Roan, Reclaiming Voir Dire, 37 THE
CHAMPION 22 (2013).
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and the trial court’s decisions to strike individuals from the panel “for
cause” if they are unable or appear to be unable to serve as competent,
impartial jurors.69 There is no limit to the number of potential jurors
who may be excluded for cause, because even one juror who is biased
or unable to follow the instructions impairs the defendant’s right to a
fair trial. Generally, however, there is a high bar and trial courts
exercise strikes “for cause” sparingly.70
Without voir dire, it is impossible to identify which jurors are
unwilling or unable to follow the law and decide the case impartially.
As early as 1895, the Supreme Court had observed that a “suitable
inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror has any
bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair
determination by him of the issues to be tried.”71 In 1981, the Supreme
Court recognized that the voir dire process is an essential mechanism
to obtaining a fair trial:
Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal
defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire[,] the
trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who
will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions
and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.72
During jury instructions, jurors passively listen (if they do), during
the course of voir dire interaction and participation is required. Jurors
must actively think in order to respond to questions posed during voir
dire instead of simply listening to the judge’s lecture about the law.
Thus, voir dire is necessary to identify members of the panel who
should not sit as jurors in the trial. Without the direct questioning,
they likely would not be identified.
The potential jurors’ responses during voir dire also inform the
parties’ decisions to exclude certain individuals from the panel with
peremptory strikes. Unlike strikes for cause, peremptory strikes are
strictly limited in number. Each side gets an equal number of
69

In Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887), the court listed the bases for strikes
for cause at the time in the state of Utah:
Consangunity or affinity within the fourth degree . . . . [b]eing the party
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having complaint against or
being accused by him in a criminal prosecution . . . .[h]aving served on
a trial jury which has tried another person for offense charged in the
indictment . . . . [h]aving formed or expressed an unqualified opinion
that the prisoner is guilty or not guilty.
70
Barbara Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545,
549–58 (1975).
71
Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895).
72
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
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peremptory strikes,73 although the number of peremptory strikes varies
between jurisdictions and based on the type of charge.74 Also unlike
strikes for cause, the parties, rather than the trial judge, control the
exercise of peremptory strikes. The parties may employ a peremptory
strike to eliminate a prospective juror for any reason at all, except for
the prospective juror’s race or gender.75 Because the peremptory
challenges are limited in number, the parties would also prefer to have
an undesirable juror struck for cause by the judge rather than employ
a peremptory strike.76
The Supreme Court has described peremptory strikes as “a means
to achieve the end of an impartial jury,”77 and stated that the right to
exercise peremptory challenges is “one of the most important of rights
secured to the accused.”78 Peremptory challenges, however, are not
required by the Constitution and “it is for the State to determine the
number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose
and the manner of their exercise.”79 Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that where a defense attorney uses a peremptory strike to remove a
prospective juror who the trial judge should have removed for cause,
there is no constitutional error.80 Voir dire, however, is necessary for
the informed exercise of peremptory challenges, and “the informed
exercise of jury challenges is an essential element in insuring jury
impartiality.”81

73

If there are co-defendants, the number of peremptory strikes is generally
divided equally among them. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 634(B)(1) (“[I]n trials involving
joint defendants, the defendants shall divide equally among them that number of
peremptory challenges that the defendant charged with the highest grade of offense
would have received if tried separately; provided, however, that each defendant shall
be entitled to at least 2 peremptory challenges.”).
74
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) allows 20 strikes for each side in a capital case, 10 or 6
depending on the type of felony charge, and 3 for misdemeanor offenses.
75
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105–08 (1986) (holding that the government
may not use peremptory challenges to exclude people on the basis of race); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (extending Batson to gender).
76
Roan, supra note 68.
77
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988).
78
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1965) (citing Pointer v. United States,
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
79
Ross, 487 U.S. at 89.
80
Id.
81
Davis v. Florida, 473 U.S. 913, 914 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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B. Limitations of the Voir Dire Process
Despite the ambitious goals of voir dire, some scholars argue that
voir dire is not particularly effective at identifying bias.82 In large part,
the effectiveness of voir dire depends on the specific manner in which
it is implemented. For example, in some courtrooms questions are
asked of the panel as a whole, and prospective jurors are asked to
provide their answers while the other prospective jurors listen. Other
judges conduct voir dire with only a single prospective juror at a time
up at the bench so that the jurors cannot hear one another’s answers
to questions. Some legal scholars and psychologists believe that voir
dire of a prospective juror in front of the entire panel is less valuable
at recognizing juror biases because jurors are less likely to acknowledge
their biases in front of others, preferring to present themselves “in a
socially desirable light” before a group.83 Many people have anxiety
over public speaking in general, and it is undoubtedly daunting to
admit to bias or an unwillingness to follow the rule of law just
announced to the group in front of a large group of people rather than
a single judge and a few lawyers. Nonetheless, voir dire before the full
panel is the more common practice84 due to concerns about judicial
economy.85
Voir dire conducted primarily by attorneys rather than the judge
is more effective. Studies show that responses by jurors to questions
asked by attorneys are typically more candid than questions asked by
judges.86 Jurors are less intimidated by lawyers and therefore are less
likely to give only “socially acceptable,” but inaccurate, answers to an
attorney as compared to a judge.87 Attorneys are also more likely to
know the details and “nuances” of their case, and in that way are more
likely to get useful information from voir dire than in judge-conducted
voir dire.88 Despite these advantages, many jurisdictions either
82

See Jeffrey Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into
Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 525, 533 (1977).
83
Marie Comiskey, Does Voir Dire Serve as a Powerful Disinfectant or Pollutant? A Look
at the Disparate Approaches to Jury Selection in the United States and Canada, 59 DRAKE L.
REV. 733, 745 (2011).
84
Approximately one third of judges allow jurors to answer questions in privacy.
Mize, supra note 26, at 28–29.
85
Christopher Mallios & Toolsi Meisiner, Using Voir Dire to Eliminate Jury Bias, 2
STRATEGIES NEWSLETTER 2, 2–3 (2010), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
programs_orgs/gjc/documents/EducatingJuriesInSexualAssaultCasesPart1.pdf.
86
Frank P. Andreano, Voir Dire: New Research Challenges Old Assumptions, 95 ILL. B.J.
474 (2007). See also Susan E. Jones, Judge-Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical
Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM BEHAV. 131–46 (1987).
87
Mize, supra note 26, at 28.
88
Id. at 28.
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prohibit entirely or limit attorney-conducted voir dire.89
Despite its flaws, voir dire remains the chief vehicle allowed by
trial courts to ferret out bias or ignorance of the law amongst potential
jurors.90 There is no other standard mechanism within our justice
system to ensure that juror bias is brought to the attention of the
parties: regardless of its effectiveness, voir dire remains the only tool
available to defendants and their lawyers to safeguard the right to a
jury comprised of neutral, unbiased fact-finders who are willing and
able to apply the law as it is stated to them. As such, sufficient voir dire
is a necessity in achieving a fair trial.
C. Judge’s Broad Discretion to Limit Voir Dire
The limitations on the effectiveness of voir dire have been
encouraged by the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review
for voir dire procedures that the Supreme Court and lower appellate
courts adhere to. In one of its earliest opinions regarding voir dire,
Connors v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s
refusal to “permit certain questions to be propounded to [prospective]
jurors” because the voir dire process “is conducted under the
supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to
its sound discretion.”91 In Aldridge v. United States, the Court recognized
the trial court’s “broad discretion as to the questions to be asked”
during the voir dire process.92 In Ham v. South Carolina, the Court
similarly acknowledged the “traditionally broad discretion accorded to
the trial judge in conducting voir dire . . . “93 More recently, in Skilling
v. United States, the Court stated that “[n]o hard-and-fast formula
dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire.”94
The Supreme Court has adhered to this deferential review despite
its recognition of the importance of voir dire to fair trials. Justice
White’s plurality opinion in Rosales-Lopez stated that “the lack of
adequate voir dire impairs the defendant’s right to exercise
peremptory challenges” and leaves the trial judge unable to fulfill his
duty “to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to
follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence.”95
89

Id. at 27.
Id. at 533–-534.
91
Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 412–16 (1895). Connors was charged
with election fraud and stealing ballot boxes, and sought to pose questions to
prospective jurors regarding their political beliefs. Id.
92
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931).
93
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973).
94
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010).
95
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.184, 188 (1981).
90
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Nonetheless, he maintained that “the adequacy of voir dire is not easily
subject to appellate review.”96 Justice White justified affording trial
judges “ample discretion” because they “must rely on [their]
immediate perceptions” of the potential jurors.97 Appellate courts
have also granted broad discretion to trial courts regarding voir dire.
As a result of the broad discretion granted to trial courts and the
restrained review of the Supreme Court and other appellate courts,
voir dire practices vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
even among judges within the same jurisdiction.98 As noted above,
depending on the jurisdiction, voir dire may be conducted by lawyers,
judges, or both.99 Some trial courts use written questionnaires rather
than oral questioning of the venire, while some trial judges may
employ both modes of questioning in the same case. In federal courts
and in the District of Columbia trial court, the trial judge conducts the
voir dire with little attorney involvement.100 When attorneys are
allowed to engage in questioning of prospective jurors, judges can
control that questioning by requiring the attorneys to submit their
proposed questions in advance or foreclosing lines of questioning as
they are posed. With few exceptions, discussed infra, the trial judge’s
discretion controls what questions are asked during the voir dire
process.
D. Trial Court Incentives to Limit Voir Dire
Trial judges often cite to a purported incentive to limit the voir
dire process: efficiency. Jury trials can be a significant investment of
judicial and government capital. Courts have always been concerned
about the length of time necessary for voir dire.101 Particularly on
crowded criminal dockets in cities and other large jurisdictions, trial
judges feel pressure to limit voir dire in order to move trials along and
clear their cases.
96

Id.
Id. at 189.
98
Mize, supra note 26, at 27.
99
Twenty-three states have predominantly or exclusively attorney-conducted voir
dire, nine states and the District of Columbia have predominant or exclusive lawyerconducted voir dire. Eighteen states have voir dire conducted by both attorneys and
judges equally. Id. at 28, tbl. 21.
100
See FED R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (“[T]he court may examine prospective jurors or may
permit the attorneys for the parties to do so.”). See also D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
24(a) (“The Court may permit the defendant or the defendant’s attorney and the
prosecutor to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination.”).
101
See James Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on their Willingness to Follow
the Law, 60 IND. L.J. 163, 180–81 (1985).
97
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Voir dire, by its nature, does not lend itself well to efficiency.
Typically, scores of citizens are called to comprise the panel of
potential jurors in a criminal case. Because of the strikes for cause and
peremptory strikes, far more people are needed than the twelve to
fourteen jurors who ultimately serve on a criminal jury of typical size.
Adequate questioning of this many individuals—often more than
fifty—can take hours or even days. In high profile cases, when many
prospective jurors are struck for cause due to exposure to media
publicity, hundreds of prospective jurors may be called for a voir dire
process that can take weeks.
There is no doubt that courts are extremely concerned with the
length of voir dire and trials generally.102 In a footnote about a serious
felony trial with substantial media attention, in which voir dire was
more than six weeks long, the Supreme Court remarked, “a voir dire
process of such length, in and of itself undermines the public
confidence in the courts and the legal profession.”103
The desire to increase the efficiency of the trial process leads
judges to choose voir dire procedures that are less effective at exposing
juror biases. For example, attorney-conducted voir dire is more likely
to produce forthcoming answers from prospective jurors regarding
bias, as discussed supra. In jurisdictions where voir dire is attorneyconducted, however, voir dire tends to be longer. In states with judgedominated voir dire, the process takes far less time.104 South Carolina’s
criminal jury selection is judge-conducted and the median length of
voir dire is just thirty minutes.105 This is in contrast to Connecticut,
which has attorney-conducted voir dire and the longest median length
of voir dire—ten hours.106 Most jurisdictions have opted for the more
efficient, but less effective judge-conducted voir dire procedure.
Similarly, questioning of prospective jurors individually is more
effective, but less efficient—and less utilized—than requiring
prospective jurors to answer before the entire panel.
For thirty years, legal observers have noted that, “judicial economy
and a desire to assure speedy trials have placed the juror voir dire
examination at the lowest level of priority in a trial.”107 The time
102

Id.
Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Court of California, Riverside Cnty. 464 U.S. 501, 510
n.9 (1984).
104
Mize, supra note 26, at 31.
105
Id. at 29.
106
Id.
107
Beverly Jennison, Trial Court Discretion in Conducting the Voir Dire Subjected to More
Stringent Scrutiny: Cordero v. United States, 33 CATH U.L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1984). See also
Robert Hanley, Getting to Know You, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 865 (1991).
103
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required for judges or attorneys to ask the additional voir dire
questions and prospective jurors to answer them is not the only added
inefficiency. When more questions and more probing questions are
posed to the prospective jurors, more prospective jurors are identified
as unfit and struck for cause, requiring even more prospective jurors
to be summoned and questioned for each criminal case. This, of
course, increases both the burden on the community for more
prospective jurors and the length of the jury selection process even
more. The cost to the courts and the community should be considered
insignificant if it ensures a fair outcome.
Concerns about judicial resources continue even as more are
resolved via guilty pleas rather than trials. Jury trials in many
jurisdictions have plummeted.108 The Supreme Court recently
observed that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”109
The increasing number of guilty pleas may make some judges even
more impatient with the amount of time consumed by jury trials,
including voir dire. A guilty plea is generally resolved in a matter of
minutes, whereas jury trials can consume days or weeks. While a guilty
plea is generally the result of both the prosecutor and the defendant
reaching an agreement, a given judge may be more inclined to focus
their frustration on the failure of the parties to reach an agreement on
the defendant because the judge has likely seen the prosecutor reach
agreements in many other cases, making it appear that the defendant
is upsetting the apple cart by rejecting a plea offer. This frustration
can lead to an unwillingness to allow a probing, effective voir dire
process.
In addition to concerns about judicial economy, judges may worry
that allowing voir dire on a particular legal topic will unfairly highlight
an issue before any evidence has come into the case.110 In an assault
case, for example, a trial judge might worry that allowing voir dire
questions about self-defense before the defendant has presented
evidence of self-defense (rather than present no defense case and
simply rely on the presumption and the burden) might provide the
defense with an unfair advantage.111 Along those lines, there may be a

108

John Simerman, In New Orleans, Jury Trials Plummet While Conviction Rate Rises,
THE ADVOCATE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/8007281148/in-new-orleans-jury-trials.
109
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
110
Gold, supra note 101, at 174.
111
Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Court of California, Riverside Cnty, 464 U.S. 501, 510
n.9 (1984).
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concern that certain questioning might “indoctrinate” prospective
jurors.112 Chief Justice Burger writing for the Court in Press-Enterprises,
noted that, “[t]he process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a
favorable one. Judges, not advocates, must control that process to
make sure privileges are not so abused.” Questions that accurately
reflect the law regarding the presumption of innocence, the burden of
proof, or the reasonable doubt standard, principles that are integral to
every single criminal trial, thus will not unfairly tip the scales or
generate a jury “favorable” to the defense.
Apprehensions about efficiency that lead to a shorter voir dire are
likely to hamper indigent defendants more than the relatively small
number of criminal defendants with significant financial means.
Defendants with resources (and prosecutors113 and police) can spend
funds investigating prospective jurors, including hiring jury
consultants or investigators with expertise in researching the
backgrounds of prospective jurors.114 Public defenders and other
court-appointed defense attorneys generally do not have the financial
means for this type of investigation. Allowing insufficient voir dire also
runs the risk of unfairly benefiting the government over the defense
because prosecutors may not have to meet their burden of proof if
jurors are unwilling to enforce it. This ultimately will result in
prejudicial burden-shifting or burden-reducing. Efficiency concerns
should not override a defendant’s right to a fair trial. In addition,
these anxieties should be lessened as a result of the high number of
cases settling via guilty plea.
IV. PRECEDENT RELATED TO VOIR DIRE ON THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT
The fundamental nature of the presumption of innocence and
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt combined with the
studies and polls, discussed supra, indicating that jurors do not always
apply these principles even after instruction, dictate in favor of
requiring voir dire, in every criminal case, to determine if prospective
jurors are willing and able to apply these legal principles. Almost three
112

Gold, supra note 101, at 170.
Keith Alexander, Questions Arise Over Criminal Background Searches of Jurors in D.C.
Superior Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/crime/questions-arise-over-criminal-background-searches-of-jurors-in-dcsuperior-court/2013/12/08/fa612fec-4e13-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html.
114
For a discussion on investigation of jurors, see generally Eric Robinson, Virtual
Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating Jurors Online, 36 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597
(2013).
113
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decades ago, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in State v. Cere115
followed this line of reasoning and required that in every criminal jury
trial in that state prospective jurors “shall be asked” about their
willingness to apply the presumption of innocence, the burden of
proof, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.116 In
reaching its conclusion that a specific inquiry regarding these legal
principles was necessary in every criminal case, the court specifically
referenced “a 1983 national survey commissioned by the Hearst
Corporation” that found that fifty percent of those surveyed believed
that a defendant must prove his innocence at a criminal trial and “of
those surveyed who had served as jurors, 49.9% “ held the same belief.117
The court also relied on a recent New Hampshire trial where ten or
eleven of twelve prospective jurors expressed a belief that the
defendant must prove he is innocent.118 The court concluded that a
specific inquiry into prospective jurors’ willingness and ability to apply
the core principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of
proof, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would
“aid in ensuring the integrity of jury verdicts.”119
The United States Supreme Court, however, has remained silent
on the issue of whether or not a specific inquiry into prospective jurors’
willingness and ability to apply the presumption of innocence and the
standard of proof is required in all criminal trials to ensure the
integrity of jury verdicts. The Court has remained silent despite a split
among the federal circuits; most circuits that have considered the issue
have ruled that such an inquiry is not required.120 State high courts
115

Other state high courts have reached similar conclusions. The Illinois Supreme
court found in People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (1984) that the refusal to ask
questions about the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof required
reversal of a conviction. The court specifically addressed the issue that the requested
voir dire questions pertained to matters of law and instruction. The Court wrote:
We are of the opinion that essential to the qualification of jurors in a
criminal case is that they know that a defendant is presumed innocent,
that he is not required to offer any evidence in his own behalf . . . . [A]n
instruction given at the end of trial will have little . . . effect [for jurors
who are prejudiced against any of these “basic guarantees”].
See also Jones v. State, 378 So.2d 797, 798 (Fl. 1980) (holding that a defense attorney
should be allowed to inquire of prospective jurors about the presumption of
innocence and the burden of proof); New Jersey v. Lumumba, 601 A.2d 1178, 1189
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that a jury must be asked whether they “understand
the basic principles of presumption of innocence . . .”).
116
State v. Cere, 480 A.2d 195, 198 (N.H. 1984).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
But among the federal circuits, the Sixth stands alone on voir dire on the
presumption of innocence.
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have also split on the issue.121
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Blount,122 found that failure to
allow voir dire on presumption of innocence upon request is
erroneous. It explained that, “[t]he primary purpose of voir dire of
jurors is to make possible the empanelling of an impartial jury through
questions that permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by
counsel.”123 It reasoned that, “a challenge for cause would be sustained
if a juror expressed his incapacity to accept the proposition that a
defendant is presumed to be innocent . . . “ that “since the failure may
have resulted in the denial of an impartial jury, the error cannot be
dismissed as harmless.”124 The Sixth Circuit’s test makes sense; instead,
if the answer is one that would identify a juror as someone who would
have to be dismissed for cause, the question is one that is essential to a
fair trial.
The argument for a specific inquiry into these related core legal
principles is supported not only by the studies and polls indicating that
jurors do not always apply them even when instructed, but also by
Supreme Court precedent regarding other questions that must be
asked during the voir dire process.
With respect to specific areas of inquiry during voir dire, the
Court has generally concluded that a defendant is entitled to specific
questions only where the failure to ask those questions will render the
trial “fundamentally unfair.”125
Unless there is some “special
circumstance” present, a “generalized but thorough inquiry into the
impartiality” of the prospective jurors is all that is constitutionally
required.126
The Supreme Court has found voir dire inquiry into a particular
subject required where it involves bias specific to the defendant or to
the case. In Morford v. United States the defendant was convicted of
refusing to produce records and the names of individuals associated
with the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship.127 After the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Morford’s conviction, the
Supreme Court reversed because the trial court had denied specific
questioning of prospective jurors who were federal government
121

See note 4.
United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973).
123
Id. at 651.
124
Id.
125
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 426 (1991); see also Morgan, 504 U.S. at 747
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
126
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986); see also Morgan, 504 U.S. at 747 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
127
Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
122
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employees regarding “the possible influence of the ‘Loyalty Order,’”128
which subjected all federal employees to “discharge upon reasonable
grounds for belief that they are disloyal to the Government of the
United States.”129 The Court found reversible error because the refusal
to inquire about this potential bias because “‘[p]reservation of the
opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right
to an impartial jury.’”130 The Court in Morford did not articulate a
standard, the satisfaction of which would trigger the constitutional
entitlement to inquire into a potential area of bias. The Court
referenced Dennis v. United States, where the inquiry had been allowed
and all the prospective jurors who were government employees denied
being biased by the order, the Court subsequently dismissed Dennis’s
concerns about the order as “vague conjecture.”131 While Morford is
distinguishable from the question of inquiring about fundamental
legal principles, i.e. bias related to an issue that arises in every criminal
case, the studies referenced supra are an even greater indication of the
potential for bias than the Loyalty Order which triggered the need for
inquiry in Morford’s case.
The Supreme Court later clarified, at least to some extent, the
standard a defendant must satisfy in order to trigger constitutionally
required inquiry into specific subject areas during voir dire in a
number of cases involving the potential for racial bias. In Aldridge v.
United States, the African American defendant accused of killing a white
police officer requested that prospective jurors be asked about whether
they were racially prejudiced against African Americans.132 The trial
court refused. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
“essential demands of fairness” under the circumstances of that case
required a specific inquiry regarding racial prejudice.133 The Court
also noted that “no harm would be done in permitting the question,
but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would
preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be
perpetrated in allowing him to sit.”134

128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258, 259 (1950).
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 165 (1950).
Morford, 339 U.S. at 259 (quoting Dennis, 339 U.S. at 171–72).
Id.; Dennis, 339 U.S. at 172.
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 309–10 (1931).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 314.
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In Ham v. South Carolina the defendant was an African-American
man who was involved in the civil rights movement and charged with
possession of marijuana.135 The defense at trial was that the police
officers in the South Carolina town were framing the defendant
because of his civil rights activities.136 Ham requested questions to
uncover bias against black people generally.137 The Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause “requires that under the
facts shown by this record the petitioner be permitted to have the juror
interrogated on the issue of racial bias.”138
In Ristaino v. Ross, however, the Supreme Court placed significant
limitations on its holdings in Aldridge and Ham.139 In that case, Ross, an
African American, was convicted of an armed robbery and assault with
intent to murder of a white Boston University security guard.140 Ross
argued that because he was African American and charged with
committing violent crimes against a white person, he was
constitutionally entitled to a specific inquiry of the prospective jurors
regarding racial bias, an inquiry the trial court had denied.141 The
Court held that Ham did not require such an inquiry in every criminal
trial where there “may be a confrontation between persons of different
races or different ethnic origins.”142 The Court concluded that specific
inquires into a particular form of bias are only constitutionally
required if, “under all of the circumstances presented there [is] a
constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about
racial prejudice, the jurors would not be as indifferent as (they stand)
unsworn.”143 The Ristaino Court concluded that although the
defendant and the victim were from different races or ethnic groups,
because there were no other racial issues involved the circumstances
of the case “did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial
prejudice might infect Ross’s trial.”144
In Rosales-Lopez, a man of Mexican descent was accused of illegally
transporting undocumented Mexicans into the country. The evidence
against him included the fact that he was engaged in a sexual
relationship with a young white woman, the mother of the
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
Id. at 525.
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 527.
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976).
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 596 (quotations omitted).
Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 598.
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prosecution’s key witness.145 The plurality opinion found no error,
stating that a trial court’s failure to honor a request for specific inquiry
into the racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors is only
“reversible error where the circumstances of the case indicate that
there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have
influenced the jury.”146 Justice White, writing the plurality opinion,
concluded that there was no such possibility, in part because the trial
court had asked questions during voir dire regarding the prospective
jurors’ feelings about illegal immigration.147
Allowing a juror who refused to apply the presumption of
innocence, or hold the government to its burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, to sit on a criminal jury would perpetrate as “gross
[an] injustice” as seating a juror who is racially biased against the
defendant. The studies discussed above indicating a high percentage
of prospective jurors’ unwillingness to apply these fundamental
principles of law, certainly meet Ristaino’s “significant likelihood”
standard. The issue should qualify as a “special circumstance,”
although that term obviously does not properly describe a
circumstance that presents a problem facing every criminal trial.
Social science, however, should be considered just as powerful proof
of a significant likelihood of bias as the common sense determinations
made by the Court in Ham and Aldridge.
The Supreme Court’s precedent has demonstrated a more
expansive view of the requirements for voir dire in death penalty cases,
particularly with respect to the sentencing phase in capital cases. In
Turner v. Murray, for example, the Court held that every death penalty
case involving an “interracial crime” requires informing the
prospective jurors of the races of the defendant and the alleged victim
and questioning “on the issue of racial bias.”148 The Court, however,
was fractured with respect to the reasoning for this holding.149 Justice
White, who wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
and O’Connor, that the holding was limited to the sentencing phase
of death penalty cases because jurors during the sentencing phase
versus the guilt/innocence phase of a capital trial.150 “[W]ith respect
to the guilt phase,” Justice White wrote, “we find this case to be

145
146
147
148
149
150

Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, at 184, 193 (1981).
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
Id. at 193.
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986).
Id. at 28–53.
Id. at 28–29, 37–38, 38 n.12.
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indistinguishable from Ristaino, to which we continue to adhere.”151
Oddly, because voir dire regarding racial prejudice necessarily must
occur before the guilt/innocence phase, capital defendants in
subsequent cases of interracial crime receive the salutary benefit of a
voir dire regarding racial prejudice although they are technically not
entitled to it. Turner’s case, however, was remanded only for a new
sentencing phase, not a new trial.152 Both Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall wrote dissents criticizing the absurdity of voir dire regarding
racial prejudice for the sentencing phase of a capital trial, while
disavowing the need for such questions during the guilt/innocence
phase of any criminal trial.153
Despite the rigorous limits placed on defense voir dire,
surprisingly, the Supreme Court does not require any “special
circumstance” or “significant likelihood” to trigger the prosecution’s
entitlement to voir dire regarding a juror’s willingness to apply the
death penalty if a capital defendant is found guilty. In Witherspoon v.
Illinois, the Court held that the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to a trial by an impartial jury were violated because
the trial court excluded for cause all prospective jurors who expressed
objections to capital punishment.154 In a footnote—one that gave rise
to the so-called “death qualified” jury—the Court noted that
prospective jurors may be excluded for cause from capital trials if they
make it “unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any
evidence . . . or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s
guilt.”155 The Court explicitly stated that the voir dire process would be
used to reveal the prospective jurors’ positions on these issues.156
The Supreme Court subsequently broadened the category of
prospective jurors who could be properly excluded for cause in Adams
v. Texas.157 There the Court concluded that jurors could not be struck
for cause “unless [their] views [on capital punishment] would prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.”158 It was decided that

151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39, 45.
Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis added).
Id.
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
Id.
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on the facts of the case, some prospective jurors had been improperly
excluded.159 Then, in Wainwright v. Witt, the Court clarified that the
language in Witherspoon’s footnote 21 was dicta and that the Adams
standard controlled, emphasizing that the Adams standard
“dispens[es] with Witherspoon’s reference to ‘automatic’ decision
making” and “does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with
‘unmistakable clarity.’”160 The Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion
of a juror who had indicated that she “thought” her views on the death
penalty would interfere with her ability to judge the case, answers that
were obtained through pointed questions about the juror’s beliefs
about the death penalty.161
The Supreme Court clarified in Lockhart v. McCree that the
prosecution’s entitlement to have prospective jurors whose views
against the death penalty would substantially impair their judgment of
the case excluded for cause necessarily included an entitlement to
specific voir dire aimed at discovering those views:
The state may challenge for cause prospective jurors whose
opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would
prevent them from impartially determining a capital
defendant’s guilt or innocence. Ipso facto, the state must be
given the opportunity to identify such prospective jurors by
questioning them at voir dire about their views on the death
penalty.162
There is no indication in Lockhart that the state’s opportunity to voir
dire jurors about their views on the death penalty is limited in any way:
it applies in every capital case. This entitlement is conferred to the
prosecution without any showing of special circumstances or a significant
likelihood that the prospective jurors will be biased against imposition
of the death penalty.
In Morgan v. Illinois, the Court held that defendants in capital
cases are entitled to the defense-corollary of death-qualification voir
dire questions.163 The Court held that under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment “a capital defendant may challenge for
cause any prospective juror” who “will automatically vote for the death
penalty in every case” and therefore would “fail in good faith to
consider
the
evidence
of
aggravating
and
mitigating

159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 49.
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
Id. at 415, 430.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170 n.7 (1986).
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735–36 (1992).
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circumstances[.]”164 Just as the Court in Lockhart determined that the
prosecution was entitled to specific voir dire to discover disabling views
against the death penalty, the Court in Morgan concluded that
defendants are entitled to specific voir dire aimed at discovering a
prospective juror’s disposition to vote for the death penalty regardless
of the evidence and instructions.165 The Court concluded that if voir
dire were “not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner’s
challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who would always
impose death following conviction, his right not to be tried by such
jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless as the State’s
right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who would never do
so.”166 In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically rejected the
argument that “direct inquiry into [the] matter” was not necessary “so
long as . . . other questioning purports to assure the defendant a fair
and impartial jury able to follow the law.”167 The Court reasoned that
“Witherspoon and its succeeding cases would be in large measure
superfluous were this Court convinced that such general inquiries
could detect those jurors with views preventing or substantially
impairing their duties in accordance with their instructions and
oath.”168
The right of a criminal defendant to exclude prospective jurors
who are unable or unwilling to apply the presumption of innocence
and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is more
fundamental than the right of a capital defendant to exclude
prospective jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty
upon a finding of guilt. Certainly, the right of the accused should
trump any of the government’s entitlements to voir dire, as the
defendant is the one on trial and whose constitutional rights the court
is there to uphold. Nor is there any reason to believe that such views
will be exposed by general inquiry rather than specific questioning any
more so than the problematic views about the death penalty would be
so exposed. Indeed, polls show that a large percentage of jurors
believe a defendant is required to prove his innocence, which
demonstrates that general inquires do not serve to lay bare such bias.

164

Id. at 729. It is unclear why the Court used the “automatically” language
explicitly eschewed by the Court in Witt. 469 U.S. at 424.
165
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 733–34.
166
Id. at 733–34 (emphasis in original).
167
Id. at 729.
168
Id. at 734–35.
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The Third Circuit in United States v. Wooton, a case that pre-dates
Lockhart, Morgan, and Ristaino, articulated a number of arguments
against a requirement for specific voir dire regarding prospective
jurors’ willingness to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.169
The main argument is that a general inquiry about whether the
prospective juror will uphold the law and only consider the evidence
presented will reveal a prospective juror’s inclination to disregard the
presumption of innocence or the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.170 General questions like these are asked routinely, but the polls
discussed above indicate that despite the broad use of these general
questions, individuals who believe that a defendant must prove his
innocence are nonetheless serving on juries for criminal cases.
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that problematic views
regarding the presumption of innocence or the standard of proof will
be revealed without specific inquiry any more than there is reason to
believe that problematic views regarding the death penalty will be
revealed by general questioning in capital cases, where prospective
jurors are undoubtedly informed that the case involves the death
penalty.
The court in Wooton also reasoned that because specific inquiries
are only constitutionally required when they reveal bias, whereas
inquiries regarding prospective jurors’ willingness to apply the
reasonable doubt standard “related to a rule of law and the juror’s
willingness to apply it,” no such inquiry can be constitutionally
required.171 The court in Wooton was ruling without the benefit of the
Supreme Court’s subsequent holdings in Lockhart and Morgan, which
make clear that an inquiry into prospective jurors’ willingness to apply
a rule of law—in those cases the law regarding imposition of the death
penalty—can be constitutionally required because it reveals potential
partiality.
The Wooton court also expressed concerns about efficiency and
the “slippery slope” of requiring specific inquiries regarding areas of
the law: “If the principle is valid as to the reasonable doubt inquiry, it
would also be valid for similar inquiries” regarding “constitutional,
substantive and procedural law that must be contained in instructions
to the jury,” which would ultimately thwart the “public interest in
reasonable expedition” of criminal trials.172 While the studies and polls
discussed earlier certainly indicate a real need to inquire specifically
169
170
171
172

United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943, 946–47 (1975).
See id. at 946.
Id.
Id. at 946–47 (internal quotations marks omitted).
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about prospective jurors’ willingness to adhere to the presumption of
innocence and the government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, there is no basis to suggest that specific inquiries are necessary
with respect to other legal issues in criminal trial, such as hearsay,
impeachment, or unanimity. Furthermore, as discussed supra, the
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof are fundamental
principles without which there cannot be a fair criminal trial. The
fundamental nature of these principles, unlike the rules of hearsay for
example, merits specific inquiry. Finally, the Supreme Court has
already started down the “slippery slope” of specific inquiry regarding
legal principles in Lockhart and Morgan, and if there are going to be
specific inquiries regarding legal principles they should include the
most fundamental principles necessary for a fair criminal trial.
V. MOVING FORWARD TOWARDS SPECIFIC VOIR DIRE REGARDING THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF, AND THE
STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
The notion of a presumption-of-innocence-and-burden-of-proof
qualified jury in a criminal trial should be entirely uncontroversial.
Courts should be concerned with identifying jurors who will be unable
or unwilling to follow the law. Those concerns should trump any
efficiency concerns, especially because as we have seen the number of
cases that make it to trial has dwindled to only five percent.173
Nevertheless, many defense attorneys seeking a specific inquiry
regarding prospective jurors’ views of the presumption of innocence
and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will still face an
uphill battle: only one federal circuit and a handful of state high courts
have found that specific voir dire regarding these fundamental
principles is required, and reviewing courts continue to grant trial
courts broad discretion with respect to the voir dire process.
Defense attorneys practicing in the jurisdictions where there are
neither precedent nor custom that establishes specific voir dire
regarding these principles174 should request it and appeal denials of
the request when it is not granted. This can be done in advance of trial
and in writing via a motion in limine. In every trial case, defense
attorneys should submit proposed voir dire that includes questions on
this topic. Keeping the proposed questions as short as possible and
litigating the issue on paper (as opposed to during valuable in-court

173

See discussion supra notes 109–110.
Virtually every jurisdiction outside of Florida, New Jersey, Illinois, and the Sixth
Circuit.
174
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time) will help avoid the courts’ concerns about efficiency.175 Requests
for questionnaires (rather than live voir dire) on the issues completed
by jurors outside the courtroom can also save the court time.
Arguments about the importance of voir dire on these bedrock
principles of law compared to the government’s need for a “deathqualified jury” should be advanced. Certainly no one can dispute that
a defendant’s right to have a jury comprised of people willing to
presume him innocent and hold the government to its high burden
would trump that of the government’s entitlement to ask questions
before trial about a juror’s ability to impose the death penalty in the
event of a conviction. Even as compared to the concerns posed in the
racial bias cases addressed by the Supreme Court, the necessity of a
jury that understands and is willing to follow the very fundamental
doctrines of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt are at least as significant as those race-bias
cases. So while there is not a Supreme Court case directly on point,
the precedent supports the arguments for a voir dire on the
presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defense attorneys in jurisdictions where voir dire on other legal
issues is allowed may be in a position to achieve a presumption of
innocence qualified jury sooner. In United States v. Allsup, the Ninth
Circuit reversed a conviction where the trial judge refused to voir dire
the jury panel on the insanity defense.176 In that case, voir dire was
judge-conducted.177 The trial judge asked the defense attorney
whether he would commit to an insanity defense. It was only when he
refused that the judge refused to voir dire on the issue.178 The Ninth
Circuit found that the defense attorney should not have to predict with
certainty his defense.179 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly
found reversible error where a trial judge failed to ask members of the
jury pool, upon defense counsel’s request, whether they would hold
175

Almost thirty years ago, James Gold suggested voir dire on legal issues to be
simple in his article cited supra note 101, at 188. He suggested that the question be
posed, “If the judge instructed you that . . . is there any reason why you would be
unwilling or unable to follow that instruction?” I would suggest a single question like,
“The judge will instruct you that _______ is presumed innocent. The judge will also
instruct you that the government has the burden of proof, not ___, and that burden is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Do any of you believe that that you would be
unwilling or unable to follow that instruction?” This sort of questioning might only
elicit “yes” answers because it suggests what the correct answer should be. A more
open-ended questioning might result in more candid responses.
176
United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 75–76 (9th Cir. 1977).
177
Id. at 70.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 70.
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the testimony of police officers in higher regard because of their
profession.180
Given that both police officer credibility and the insanity defense
are issues about which the jury would receive instructions from the
court, these cases are hard to square with the logic of United States v.
Price,181 where the Ninth Circuit, en banc, found no abuse of discretion
in failing to voir dire the jury on the presumption of innocence and
the burden of proof. Illustrating how these cases are at odds with one
another along with the use of social science that shows the difficulty
jurors have with these legal issues, should allow the defense to prevail.
Price and cases like it in other jurisdictions simply fail to address the
social science illustrating how little prospective jurors understand
these core legal values. Bringing the data to trial and appellate courts
attention may increase the likelihood of voir dire on these essential
legal issues.
Use of the social science is the defense attorney’s key to getting
the voir dire necessary for defendants.182 Both requests in the trial
court and on appeal should consider explicit reliance on the social
science that demonstrates the need for specific inquiry regarding these
fundamental principles. Unfortunately, the polls are likely to be
criticized because some are dated. There is, however, no reason to
believe that Americans’ views regarding the presumption of innocence
or the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt have subsequently
shifted. Public defender offices and defense firms should, however,
consider pooling resources in order to fund a new round of polling on
these issues.183 If the courts are to be receptive to this issue at all, it will
180

See e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Contreras-Castro, 825 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Washington, 819 F.2d
221 (9th Cir. 1987).
181
United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978).
182
Reliance on social science has swayed courts on the issue of eyewitness
identification, juvenile culpability, adolescent brain development, and the death
penalty for those with mental health issues. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–19
(2002) (utilizing scientific arguments of brain development to declare death penalty
for mentally retarded persons unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565–
72 (2005) (reasoning that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional and cites to
developmental differences between juveniles under 18 and adults); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 67–69 (2010) (reasoning that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
imposition of life without parole sentence on juvenile offender who did not commit
homicide); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462–66 (2012) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of life without parole sentence on juvenile
offenders).
183
Given the crisis in indigent defense, funds for such a poll, which if professionally
administered may run in the tens of thousands of dollars, may be scarce. Partnering
with a psychology department at a nearby university or a law school may help with
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likely depend on updated polling demonstrating that deeply
problematic views regarding these principles continue to exist on a
widespread basis.
Concerted efforts by defense attorneys to raise the issue and wellreasoned appellate briefs and arguments will someday hopefully bring
about the presumption of innocence and burden of proof qualified
jury.

access to resources.

